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The NBA Strategy of Broadcast
Television Exposure: A Legal Application
John A. Fortunato, Ph.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Sports television is a unique form of broadcasting compared to
other programming genres because of the relationship between a
professional sports league and a broadcast network. The most
unique characteristic of sports television is that a league and a
television network sign a multi-year contract for broadcasting rights.
Television networks pay large sums of money1 to a sports league for
the rights to broadcast a certain number of games over a certain
number of years. The television network then sells the commercial
time during these games to advertisers. This unique relationship
exists because a sports league is granted permission by the federal
government through the Sports Broadcasting Act (hereinafter
“SBA”),2 to act as a cartel and collectively package and sell the
broadcast rights of its games to television networks. Professional
sports leagues reap their greatest economic rewards and gain their
most significant exposure source through network television
contracts.
The exposure of nationally televised National Basketball
Association (hereinafter “NBA”) games, however, must be properly
maintained so the value of the NBA broadcast rights remain high.
The government once again is vital in permitting the NBA to
maintain control over national television exposure as evidenced in
Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship and WGN Cont’l Broad. Co. v.

* Assistant Professor, Department of Advertising, College of Communications, University
of Texas at Austin; Ph.D. Rutgers University.
1
The NBA’s four-year, $2.6 billion television contracts with NBC and Turner
Broadcasting expire after the 2001-02 season. Some speculate that Michael Jordan’s return
will make the next NBA contract worth as much as 50 percent more. Terry Lefton, Sports:
The NBA’s Digital Rebound, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD MAGAZINE, June 25, 2001, available
at http://www.thestandard.net/article/0,1902,27219,00.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2001).
2
15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (1961).
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NBA,3 which provides a justification for how the NBA, as a leaguewide collective, and not individual teams, controls the national
television exposure of league games.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Literature regarding sports leagues and government, and sports
leagues and television networks provides insight into these complex
relationships. In examining government and sports, Noll4 comments
that “[v]irtually every major public policy toward business—
antitrust, labor relations, taxation, even the constitutional prohibition
against slavery—has a potentially significant application to sports.”5
While Noll makes a valid point of applying public policy toward
sports, the provisions of the Sports Broadcasting Act and Chicago
Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship and WGN Cont’l Broad. Co. v. NBA6 allow
the NBA to benefit both monetarily and exposure-wise from its
control of league television coverage.
Parente7 points out that “[t]elevision was relatively unimportant to
sports until the end of the 1950’s when organized professional team
sports began to look at television as a potential major source of
revenue.”8 Parente also claims that “once a sport, league, or team
has had its ‘product’ bought by television for use as programming,
3

754 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
Roger G. Noll is a professor of public policy at Stanford University. Professor Noll’s
principle area of interest is public policies towards business. Noll has authored or coauthored “11 books and over 250 articles in areas such as telecommunications policy,
federally supported research and development, environmental policy, and the management
of universities.” California Council on Science and Technology Council Member profiles at
http://www.sdsc.edu/ccst/ccst/about/council/noll.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
5
ROGER G. NOLL, GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 1 (The Brookings
Institute) (1974).
6
961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992).
7
Donald Parente is an associate professor of advertising at Middle Tennessee State
University. Dr. Parente’s research interests include “the way advertising professionals write
objectives, advertising campaign strategy and sports management.” Middle Tennessee State
University faculty profiles at http://www.mtsu.edu/~jour/advertis/faculty.html (last visited
Nov. 16, 2001).
8
Donald E. Parente, The Interdependence of Sports and Television, 27 J.
Communication No. 3, 128, 129 (1977).
4
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that entity can seldom exist thereafter, at least in the same style or
manner, without the financial support of television.”9 McChesney10
claims that “successful management of professional sports leagues
and franchises is based on the capacity to best exploit rights
payments.”11 Bellamy12 concludes that “television could survive
without professional sports, but professional sports could not exist in
their present form without television monies.”13 Network television
contracts have become the largest source of revenue for sports
franchises.
Network television also provides the most important exposure
vehicle for a professional sports league. Wenner14 points out that the
most common involvement people have with sports is through
viewing games on television.15 Lever16 and Wheeler17 also claim
9

Id. at 128.
Robert W. McChesney is Research Professor in the Institute of Communications
Research and the Graduate School of Library and Information Science at the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. “His work concentrates on the history and political economy
of communication, emphasizing the role media play in democratic and capitalist societies.”
Robert W. McChesney personal biography at http://www.robertmcchesney.com/Bio.html
(last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
11
Robert W. McChesney, Media Made Sport: A History of Sports Coverage in the
United States, in MEDIA, SPORTS, AND SOCIETY 65 (Lawrence A. Wenner ed., 1989).
12
Robert V. Bellamy, Jr. is Associate Professor of Mass Communication & Society at
Duquesne University.
Duquesne University personal home page directory at
http://www2.duq.edu/DUHP/HomePage.cfm (last visited Oct. 23, 2001).
13
Robert V. Bellamy, Jr., Professional Sports Organizations: Media Strategies, in
MEDIA, SPORTS, AND SOCIETY 120 (Lawrence A. Wenner ed., 1989).
14
Lawrence A. Wenner is Professor of Communications at the University of San
Francisco. Dr. Wenner’s areas of interest include “[m]edia and sport; media criticism;
media audience; media and commodification of culture; constructions of race, ethnicity, and
gender in media.”
University of San Francisco faculty profile at
http://www.usfca.edu/asfaculty/wenner.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2001).
15
Lawrence A. Wenner, Media, Sports, and Society: The Research Agenda, in MEDIA,
SPORTS, AND SOCIETY 15 (Lawrence A. Wenner ed., 1989).
16
Janet Lever is an Associate Professor of Sociology at California State Los Angeles.
“Dr. Lever is an expert on leisure studies, applied sociology, gender, and the social
consequences of human sexuality.” California State Los Angeles News Releases at
http://www.calstatela.edu/univ/ppa/newsrel/pitch17.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2001).
17
Stanton Wheeler is the Ford Foundation Professor of Law and the Social Sciences at
Yale Law School. Dr. Wheeler’s “teaching and research interests include the sociology of
law, deviant behavior and social control, and socio-legal aspects of popular culture,
including sports and music.” Yale University Institution for Social and Political Studies
faculty profile at http://www.yale.edu/isps/faculty/Wheeler.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2001).
10
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that “the single most dominant influence on the way in which sport is
experienced in American society is that of the mass media,
particularly television.”18
With the importance of network television to a professional sports
league established, the purpose of this article is to provide a legal
application to the broadcast television exposure strategy of the NBA,
as it is the government that permits the professional sports and
television network relationship to exist and the national television
exposure strategy of the NBA to flourish. Description and analysis
of the SBA and Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship and WGN Cont’l
Broad. Co. v. NBA will help answer the following research question:
what is the federal government’s philosophy regarding sports
broadcasting on network television? In addition to a description and
analysis of these government provisions, key informant interviews
are utilized to provide depth into the NBA strategy that results from
the permission granted through these governmental provisions.
Personal interviews were conducted with: Dave Checketts, former
President and CEO of Madison Square Garden; Ed Desser, President
of NBA Television & New Media Ventures; Brian McIntyre, NBA
Senior Vice President of Communications; Mike Pearl, Senior Vice
President and Executive Producer of Turner Sports; Tommy Roy,
NBC Sports Executive Producer; and David Stern, NBA
Commissioner.
III. FINDINGS
In the situation of sports broadcasting, the professional sports
leagues initiated federal government involvement in trying to gain
exceptional government approval to collectively package and sell the
broadcast rights for their games to television networks. The selling
of rights fees for games to television broadcasters was originally a
major point of contention between league and television executive
personnel regarding television’s impact on game attendance and
separate franchises selling their individual broadcast rights,
18
Janet Lever & Stanton Wheeler, Mass Media and the Experience of Sport, 20
COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 125 (1993).
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potentially creating an economic imbalance among all teams within a
league.19 Horowitz points out that “[t]he prospect of significant
broadcast revenues, and the threat that broadcasts would adversely
affect attendance, led to the adoption of rules in each sport that
restricted inter-team competition for the sale of broadcast rights.”20
These rules became a force behind several antitrust suits surrounding
laws of broadcast policy.
A. Antitrust Issues
The first antitrust issue was raised in 1946, when major league
baseball adopted a rule prohibiting one team from broadcasting a
game in another team’s home territory or from another stadium
without the home team’s consent.21 Fearing the creation of a system
that would not permit open competition, the Department of Justice
became involved in the settlement of this antitrust issue. Many of
the early sports broadcast suits dealt with the televising of the
National Football League (hereinafter “NFL”) and on October 9,
1951, the Department of Justice filed suit against the NFL.22
In United States v. Nat’l Football League,23 Judge Allan K. Grim
decided to uphold the legality of the NFL bylaw, which prevented
the telecasting of an outside game in a third team’s home territory
when that team had a home game.24 For example, a football game
between the Chicago Bears and the Green Bay Packers could not be
televised into the New York market if the New York Giants were
playing a home game. This ruling would in effect allocate marketing
territories for the purpose of restricting competition. Horowitz points
out that “the court found that such a restraint was reasonable because
of the adverse effects that competitive outside telecasts would be

19

See Ira Horowitz, Sports Broadcasting, in GOVERNMENT
275, 275-83 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1974).
20
Id. at 279.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 281.
23
116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
24
See Horowitz, supra note 19, at 281.

AND THE

SPORTS BUSINESS

FINAL.FORTUN

138

1/10/02 5:07 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.12:133

likely to have on the home club’s attendance.”25 The Court also
ruled that because of the mutual interdependence of the franchises,
the restriction would help preserve the league by protecting the
weaker teams’ home attendance.26 The Court did find two illegal
restrictions on broadcasts: (1) the prohibition against telecasts by
another team when the home team was also telecasting an away
game in its home territory, and (2) all restrictions on outside radio
broadcasts.27
The professional sports leagues did not feel that the ruling of the
Court interfered with the situation where all of the teams could
collectively bargain as a cartel in negotiations for broadcast rights.28
Consequently, the NBA and NBC signed the first league-wide
television agreement in 1954; that year, the first nationally televised
basketball game between the Boston Celtics and the New York
Knicks was broadcast on NBC.29 Following television contracts
between the American Football League and ABC in 1960, and the
NFL and CBS on April 24, 1961, the NFL brought a petition seeking
an interpretation of the 1953 ruling in United States v. Nat’l Football
League.30 Judge Grim again ruled that by pooling television rights
the franchises eliminated competition among themselves in the sale
of these rights.31 Horowitz explains that “[t]he [C]ourt also held that
by granting to CBS the right to determine which games would be
telecast and where, the agreement violated the 1953 judgment
enjoining the league from entering into any agreement that could
tend to restrict broadcast areas.”32 The Court therefore deemed the
NFL-CBS contract to be in violation of the 1953 ruling.33

25

Id.
See 116 F. Supp. at 323-24.
27
See id. at 330.
28
See Horowitz, supra note 19, at 281.
29
PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, PLAYING FOR DOLLARS: LABOR RELATIONS
BUSINESS 98 (1996).
30
196 F. Supp 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
31
See id. at 447.
32
Horowitz, supra note 19, at 283.
33
See 196 F. Supp. at 447.
26

AND THE

SPORTS
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B. Sports Broadcasting Act
Having failed in the judiciary, the leagues and the networks
petitioned Congress for permission to pool and sell the broadcast
rights to television networks. The result of hearings before the
House of Representatives was the SBA, which was approved by
Congress on September 30, 1961.34 The new law simply granted
clubs in professional sports leagues an antitrust exemption allowing
them to pool their broadcast rights for the purpose of selling those
rights to the highest bidder.35 The purpose of the SBA is different
from that of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (hereinafter “Sherman
Act”),36 which is designed to ensure free market competition and
prevent restriction of trade.
The SBA established the legality of the professional sports
leagues’ practice of packaging league games to a network and not
allowing teams to individually sell their rights, which would
otherwise be an unlawful restraint on competition. The SBA is,
however, a “special interest legislation, a single-industry exception to
a law designed for the protection of the public.”37 Section 1291 of
the SBA amended antitrust laws so that they “shall not apply to any
joint agreement by or among persons engaging in or conducting the
organized professional team sports of football, baseball, basketball,
or hockey, by which any league of clubs . . . sells or otherwise
transfers all right or any part of the right of such league’s member
clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games.”38
The SBA facilitates the acquisition of network television money
by professional sports leagues, entitling the leagues to their greatest
source of revenue. In its current television broadcast contract signed
on November 12, 1997, and beginning with the 1998-99 season, the
NBA once again substantially increased its broadcast rights revenues

34

15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (1961).
See id.
36
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1914, 1948).
37
Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 671 (7th
Cir. 1992).
38
15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1961).
35
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to a total of $2.64 billion.39 NBC doubled its payments to a total of
$1.75 billion (up from $750 million) and Turner more than doubled
its payments to a total of $890 million (up from $350 million) for a
four-year contract through the 2001-02 season.40 Tommy Roy, CoExecutive Producer for the NBA on NBC, describes the professional
sports league and television network partnership as a cycle where if
the NBA does well, more people watch the games, which provide
higher ratings and advertising, and eventually lead to rights fees for
the league.41
C. Exposure: The “Less is More” Strategy
In addition to unmatched revenue, television networks provide
unmatched exposure for a professional sports league. Brian
McIntyre, NBA Senior Vice President of Communications, claims
that the NBA can reach as many people in one broadcast as it can in
numerous newspapers or local newscasts.42 He characterizes a game
broadcast, whether it is local or national, as nothing more than a twoand-a-half-hour infomercial for your product.43 McIntyre explains
the advantage of a national broadcast, stating:
local NBC has three-to-four minutes a night on their local
news. Multiply that times seven and it is twenty-one to
twenty-eight minutes a week—one broadcast gives us
two-and-a-half-to-three hours depending on if you have a
pre-game and a post-game. [With] our broadcast partners,
we are going right to our target audience. The Finals and

39
See generally INFOPLEASE.COM, The Rights Stuff: Major sports and their television
deals as of Sept. 1, 2000, available at: http://www.infoplease.com/ipsa/A0877494.html (last
visited Nov. 18, 2001).
40
See id.
41
Interview with Tommy Roy, Co-Executive Producer, NBA on NBC (Oct. 21, 1998).
42
Interview with Brian McIntyre, Senior Vice President of Communications, NBA
(Dec. 16, 1998).
43
Id.
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the All-Star Game we are going to a bigger audience,
bringing the casual fans.44
While the SBA permits a league as a collective to sell broadcast
rights for its games to networks, it does not prohibit individual teams
from entering into their own national television contracts.45 These
individual team broadcast contracts hinder the league’s control and
maintenance over national television exposure. The NBA took
several measures, including litigation, to limit the rights of individual
teams to sell games so the league could maximize the value of the
television rights it sells to the national networks.46
During the late 1970’s and through the mid-1980’s broadcast
exposure was a major problem for the NBA: few regular season
games were being broadcast, some playoff games were not being
broadcast on television, and even some games of the NBA Finals
were being broadcast on tape delay.47 This exposure problem is
highlighted by the 1981 NBA Finals between the Boston Celtics and
the Houston Rockets when four of the six games were broadcast on
tape delay at 11:30 p.m.48 One of the first initiatives the NBA
implemented during these years to increase the league’s finances and
marketability was for the league as a whole to take greater control of
its television exposure. Specifically, the league exerted more control
over the independent franchises that had the capability to get their
games broadcast on national television superstations. The NBA
defined a superstation as “any commercial over-the-air television
station whose broadcast signal is received outside of the local
Designated Market Area.”49 The Atlanta Hawks, Chicago Bulls, and
New Jersey Nets were three franchises who were able to get their
games broadcast on the three NBA-recognized superstations: TBS,
44

Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1961).
46
See infra section Exposure: Superstations and the WGN Lawsuit.
47
See generally 754 F. Supp. at 1342.
48
See id.; see also Steve Pate, Blast Off!, NBA.COM, available at
http://global.nba.com/history/1981_rockets.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2001).
49
Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1345
(N.D. Ill. 1991).
45
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WGN and WOR respectively.50 The league, along with its broadcast
partners, can control exposure by creating a programming schedule
that carefully selects days and times of games and also the players
and teams who will appear on network television broadcasts.
The NBA adopted a “less is more” strategy where the league
would better attempt to control the positioning of the NBA on
television and not saturate the market with games.51 Regarding the
“less is more” strategy, NBA Commissioner David Stern states,
“when your ratings are not strong, and your product is not secure in
its identity, a lot of exposure is not a good thing because the worst
thing for a bad product is a lot of exposure, and so we were trying to
shape up our product at the same time that we were trying to define
exposure.”52 Ed Desser, President of NBA Television, also describes
the rationale behind the “less is more” philosophy. He states:
The market was only ready to accept so much and one of
the strategies that we were fond of talking about . . . was
“less is more,” and “less is more” was really all about . . .
not overexpos[ing] ourselves . . . try[ing] to make each
telecast special. We are fighting for ratings. We want our
ratings to be as high as possible, on average, and therefore
there is potentially too much exposure. If you are in a
battle for your lives and what defines being on network
television is a twenty share, [the question becomes] how
do you get a twenty share? You do a variety of things. . . .
You don’t put too many games on; you [heavily]
promote . . . the games you do put on; you make sure you
schedule each game in a logical way; you have good
matchups, etc.; you produce it well; you have certain
consistency of scheduling so people can know to expect it;
maybe you don’t have wall-to-wall games so that people
have to choose [one game over another]; you try and have
measured amounts of [games] in the marketplace . . .
push[ing] up the average. At a time when you are a
second-class citizen, increasing your average is more
50
51
52

See id.
See infra notes 52-53.
Interview with David Stern, Commissioner, NBA (Apr. 14, 1999).
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important than increasing the total. . . . What is a more
attractive thing for a television network, one game that
gets a ten rating, or five games that get a two rating? . . .
One game that gets a ten rating, and so we had to control
the amount of product in the marketplace in order to
garner enough [viewers] that [advertisers] would pay
attention.53
D. Exposure: Superstations and the WGN Lawsuit
In 1979, the NBA made its initial attempt to legislate the exposure
of its game telecasts. The NBA’s Board of Governors adopted a
resolution that all future television contracts entered into by
individual teams would be made “subject to the Constitution, Bylaws
and all other rules and regulations” of the league, “as they presently
exist and as they may from time to time be amended,” subject to “the
terms of any existing or future” television contracts entered into by
the league and subject to review by the Commissioner to guarantee
compliance.54 The Board of Governors also passed a resolution
providing the league with “the exclusive right to enter into contracts
for the direct telecasting of NBA games by cable systems located
outside the territory of all members.”55
The new resolution voided a national contract the New York
Knicks had signed with the USA Network, which was to pay the
Knicks $1.5 million for the broadcast rights to their games for three
seasons from 1979-80 to 1981-82.56 The NBA continued with their
“less is more” strategy restricting exposure, and for the 1980-81
season teams were limited to forty-one over-the-air telecasts because,
for example, the Atlanta Hawks for 1979-80 season had broadcast all
eighty-two of their regular season games on TBS.57 At the time, the
NBA was not receiving revenue from independent individual team

53
54
55
56
57

Interview with Ed Desser, President, NBA Television (Aug. 26, 1998).
NBA, 754 F. Supp. at 1342.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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broadcast rights contracts—only the Hawks profited from their
contract with TBS.
Teams were still permitted to sell the other forty-one non-network
games (if they were not on CBS—the national television network for
the NBA from 1974 to 1990) to a local cable outlet only, and keep all
of the revenue from whatever contracts they signed. The NBA
agreed to broadcast its games on national cable outlets, signing
contracts for the 1982-83 and 1983-84 season with both ESPN and
USA for forty games with ESPN televising on Sunday night and
USA televising on Thursday night.58 The NBA would not allow any
of these forty-one non-network games to be nationally broadcast
opposite its new cable partners.
The NBA continued to impose restraints on its teams’ ability to
broadcast independently on a national network by limiting the
superstation games to twenty-five for the 1985-86 season. In
October 1989, the NBA passed a resolution “‘blacking out’
superstation games on nights when an NBA game is shown
nationally on cable as part of the league’s national cable package.”59
While individual teams are not permitted to broadcast a game on a
superstation opposite a TNT or TBS game, teams can air a game
head to head with a TNT or TBS game, but strictly on a local overthe-air or local cable channel. For example, if the New York Knicks
are playing the Chicago Bulls on TNT, the game could not be
broadcast nationally on WGN because it is a superstation, but could
be televised on the Madison Square Garden Network (hereinafter
“MSG”), the local carrier for the Knicks. Games that are televised
on NBC are not permitted to be broadcast by an individual team
carrier at all, not even on tape delay.60 For example, if the New York
Knicks are playing the Chicago Bulls on NBC, neither WGN nor
MSG would be permitted to broadcast that game live or at any other
later moment.
In 1990, WGN and the Chicago Bulls challenged the NBA’s
attempt to control the television packaging of its product by reducing
58
59
60

754 F. Supp. at 1343.
Id.
Id. at 1344.
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the number of games on superstations from twenty-five to twenty.
WGN and the Bulls sued the NBA to have the number remain at
twenty-five, arguing that the antitrust exemption provided in the
SBA of 196161 did not apply, and this limit was an unreasonable
restraint of trade.62 The Bulls had approved the Board of Governors’
resolutions for earlier reductions to forty-one and subsequently
twenty-five games, but moved to block this further restriction.63 At
the time WGN reached 34% of all of the television households
nationwide, and 31% of those homes were outside of the Chicago
area.64 WGN received no money from cable subscription, and
relying on advertising sales for 98% of its revenues, was losing
money by not having the Bulls games broadcast to the entire nation.
The Bulls and WGN also had a successful ratings and advertising
commodity with the broadcast rights to the most talented and
marketable player—Michael Jordan.
In the early 1990’s, WGN and the Bulls also failed to take
advantage of a tremendous advertising opportunity.
Due to
microwave transmission technology, a superstation could generate
two signals, one for local over-the-air, and another to send out to the
rest of the nation. Ted Turner had been using this technology of
splitting the feed with TBS in Atlanta and thus, for one program, had
the ability to double the advertising revenues with two feeds to sell
two different sets of advertising: (1) local spots for Atlanta viewers
only, and (2) national spots which would be seen throughout the
country.65 While WGN had not been splitting the feed for its Bulls
telecasts, the superstation had been using this transmission
technology for its broadcasts of Cubs baseball games.66 For its
baseball telecasts, WGN offered advertisers three possibilities: (1)
over-the-air Chicago only, (2) national cable only, or (3) both.67

61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 1343.
Id.
Id. at 1342-43.
754 F. Supp. at 1348.
Id. at 1346-47.
Id. at 1346-47.
Id. at 1347.
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E. NBA Position on WGN and Exposure
The positioning of the NBA in this legal matter and its rationale
behind the need to limit the number of national broadcasts on
superstations refers directly back to the main benefits a league
achieves when it signs a national television contract: revenue and the
proper exposure. The NBA was not receiving any revenue or
exposure from the contract between the Bulls and WGN. The beliefs
of the NBA were clearly spelled out in the Proposed Findings of Fact
and the Proposed Findings of Law that were filed by the NBA and
cited in the case.68 The extensive rationale of the NBA’s argument
is:
The reduction protects the teams’ grant of exclusivity in
their local markets, and enhances the value of the teams’
local television contracts by protecting the exclusivity of
those contracts from dilution caused by the importation of
games from other NBA cities by reason of superstation
telecasts.
It also promotes the teams’ media and
sponsor relationships. It protects the value of the market
extension agreements pursuant to which cable systems
pay a fee shared equally by all NBA teams for the right to
telecast local cable games in a team’s extended market. It
enhances the ability of the NBA to grant exclusive and
lucrative national broadcast contracts and protects the
value of those contracts.
It ensures the league is
compensated for all national exposure of its games. It
preserves the price sponsors pay for national exposure on
NBA national cablecasts and broadcasts. It promotes the
NBA’s relationship with the national broadcast and cable
networks. It enhances the perception in the marketplace
that the NBA offers a unique product and has control over
that product. It fosters the development by the NBA of
new technologies. It improves the level of competition in
the television market and benefits consumers by making
the NBA a stronger competitor and by providing greater
national network coverage of NBA games. And in the
68

Id. at 1358-59.
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long run, if the NBA as a league has no right to regulate
the national distribution of NBA games by individual
teams, the attractiveness of the league’s national television
product will be undermined, its national and local
revenues will decline, the weaker teams will face financial
difficulties, and the league’s future will be threatened.69
The NBA also believed that its position was viable under the
Sherman Act because the reduction of games actually promotes
competition “between the NBA’s network packages and other
network programming and between local NBA broadcasts by the
teams and other local programming.”70
F. Ruling
Seven weeks after the complaint was filed by WGN and after a
five-day trial, Judge Hubert Will, a federal district court judge in
Chicago, ruled in favor of WGN and the Bulls.71 Judge Will ruled
that “because the games sold to WGN were owned and transferred
by the Bulls rather than the league, the SBA does not, by its terms,
cover this case.”72 Judge Will continued “the Bulls and the other
teams still own and control the rights to the games not included in
the league’s contracts with NBC and TNT, and therein lies the
NBA’s vulnerability to this lawsuit.”73 The Court ruled that the
NBA produced no credible evidence, anecdotal or statistical, that
inclined the Court to believe that superstation broadcasts steal
viewers from another team’s local telecasts, damaging ratings and
revenues.74 The Court also found the arguments of the NBA under
the Sherman Act75 invalid because the Act prohibits every contract,
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade.76
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id.
754 F. Supp. at 1359.
Id. at 1351.
Id.
Id. at 1351-52.
Id. at 1359.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1914, 1948)
Id. at 1351.
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The ruling in favor of WGN and the Bulls did not end the litigation
between the NBA and WGN. The original ruling was reaffirmed on
appeal in Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship and WGN Cont’l Broad.
Co. v. NBA.77 In 1993, the NBA attempted to adopt rules which
would ban superstation telecasts. In 1995, Judge Will ruled that the
NBA plan was an antitrust violation and that WGN and the Bulls
would pay the NBA $40,000, rather than the $100,000 the NBA had
sought, for each game the Bulls broadcast outside of Chicago.78 The
ruling by Judge Will was largely based on the fact that the NBA was
already receiving more than $2 million a year in copyright payments
for Bulls games on WGN. On September 10, 1996, the Seventh
Circuit79 banned WGN from airing Bulls games nationally claiming
that the federal judge had overstepped his bounds in 1995 in his
favorable ruling for WGN.80
One notable aspect of the original lawsuit and its appeal was that it
showed the NBA would assert its right to control its product through
the SBA. The league was not anxious for any competition with its
other national broadcasts and did not want games being broadcast
nationally without the league receiving any of the revenues. Because
the Hawks had reduced their TBS schedule to twenty games—TBS
signed an agreement not to challenge any reduction in the number of
superstation telecasts providing the rules applied equally to all
superstations with the NBA in attempting to acquire the national
television contract from ESPN and USA to TNT, also owned by Ted
Turner—and because the Nets were well below that figure with only
six games on superstation WOR, the entire WGN lawsuits amounted
to a dispute over the broadcasting of five games on the surface; but
the message of the need for the proper exposure and the impact that
the proper exposure had on national television revenue was clear.
The doggedness of the NBA in litigation also sent an unequivocal
message to all NBA franchises who might attempt to challenge the
league’s national television exposure structure.
77

NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992).
Jim McConnville, WGN-TV/NBA Headed Back to Court in 6-Year-Old Case;
Superstation Will Not Be Allowed To Broadcast Bulls Games During this Round of
Litigation, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 21, 1996, at 45.
79
Id.
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Id.
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Ed Desser, President of NBA Television, describes the NBA
response to the WGN lawsuits stating, “we (the NBA) have an
overall strategy, an overall arrangement where teams exploit local
rights and the league exploits national and international rights on
behalf of all the teams collectively.”81 Brian McIntyre, NBA Senior
Vice President of Communications, describes the problems that arise
when there is a system where superstations are broadcasting at their
own volition and not that of the league. McIntyre states, “it is our
(the NBA’s) property,” the questions are “How do we best position
it? How do we best project our image? And there is no doubt that
television plays a major role in this. [There was] no money coming
into the league,” instead it was “going right to one team, and killing
any kind of national exposure potential.”82
G. NBA Exposure Strategy
As a result of the NBA efforts through the WGN case, the league,
and not individual teams, has control over all of its national
television exposure. Once the league has permission granted by the
government for economic and exposure control over its product, the
NBA along with its broadcast partners can determine how to best
present the league in terms of placement of the schedule and which
teams and players to televise. TNT broadcasts NBA games twice a
week and TBS broadcasts once a week during the regular season.83
NBC begins its NBA broadcast schedule with a prime-time
doubleheader on Christmas night and televises NBA games at least
every Sunday from the end of January through the playoffs.84 All
NBA broadcast partners increase the number of game telecasts
during the playoffs. The preference of network television in
scheduling league games is still a prevalent strategy employed by the
NBA. As the largest revenue source for the NBA and to preserve the
81

Desser, supra note 53.
McIntyre, supra note 42.
83
See
generally
NBA
NATIONAL
TV
SCHEDULE,
available
at:
http://www.nba.com/schedules/national_tv_schedule/index.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2001).
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See id.
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lucrative broadcast income, television networks need to broadcast the
best games that will achieve the highest audience ratings and
advertising dollars. To demonstrate the importance of the network
television schedule, the overall NBA game schedule is composed
after the national television schedule is arranged.
The broadcast partners are always involved in formulating the
NBA season and television schedule. NBC and Turner have input in
the initial drafts of the schedule of games that will be on their
networks and the times that the games will be played. Mike Pearl,
the Senior Vice President and Executive Producer for Turner Sports,
states that Turner submits a best wish list of games to the NBA and
the league uses that input when making its scheduling decisions.85
This negotiation of the program schedule is where the strength of the
relationship between the NBA and its broadcast partners can easily
be recognized; the national television broadcasts are the best
opportunity to showcase the league from the NBA perspective, and
the networks simply want the most popular game. Commissioner
Stern explains that “we used to be much more insistent that every
team be represented a certain amount, and frankly we have been
more open to the networks’ strategic view, which is the way to grow
the sport is to focus on those teams that people want to see.”86 Ed
Desser describes in detail the scheduling of the NBA in terms of the
preference that is given to its broadcast partners:
It starts with kind of a basic framework that is negotiated
as part of the television agreement. We don’t know what
the games will be, but there are basic parameters of how
many regular season, how many Sunday afternoon, how
many Sunday prime-time [games there will be]. . . . The
next [step] is actually putting together the schedule for the
particular year, and that is put together based upon
accumulating building availability dates, and NBC and
Turner scheduling availability dates.
There are a
[number] of place holders on their schedule for the NBA
85

Telephone Interview with Mike Pearl, Senior Vice President & Executive Producer,
Turner Sports (Feb. 25, 1999).
86
Stern, supra note 52.
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on NBC [in] a particular pattern. Generally speaking,
most Sundays are now formatted in a triple-header format.
There are a fair number of deviations, so there are some
single-headers during the NCAA Tournament and there
are some split doubleheaders. . . . Basically we occupy
most of the 5:30 [p.m.] to 8:00 [p.m.] slots in the first
quarter and usually at least one other, either 12:30 [p.m.]
or 1:00 [p.m.] to 3:30 [p.m.], or 3:30 [p.m.] to 6:00
[p.m.] . . . So you [receive] that information then there are
just certain things you know. For a 1:00 game on a
Sunday afternoon you know you are basically limited to
the east[ern] and central time zones. So you look to see
what buildings are available on that particular Sunday.
Is . . . [Madison Square] Garden available? Is Miami
available? Is Chicago available? Is Detroit available,
etc.? And the flip side of what buildings are available, is
what teams are available to travel? If a team isn’t
available, [if] it doesn’t have a building available to play a
home game, then by definition [it is] available to play a
road game. . . . [T]hat is the basic pattern. Then it
becomes [a matter of] assembling this mosaic. . . . [The
factors include] last year in the playoffs the Knicks and
Miami was a great matchup, there is a rivalry there, [there
is a] slot from 1:00 [p.m.] to 3:30 [p.m.] and . . . Miami
arena [is available]. Are the Knicks available to play in
Miami that day? . . . [If] they are . . . [that step is]
done. . . . [T]rying to come up with . . . compelling
matchups and assembling the network schedule is the first
part of the process because after that . . . [if] the Knicks
are in Miami Sunday afternoon, then you . . . create the
road trip around it. . . . [If] Orlando is free on Friday
night, we’ll have them play in Orlando Friday, and Miami
on Sunday and maybe Monday night. Since it’s not the
next day per se, they could play in Atlanta, so there’s a
nice little road trip . . . [and that step is done].87
The scenario of the national television schedule dictating the
overall NBA schedule as described by Desser can be applied using
the 2000-01 NBA schedule, most notably with the 1999-2000
87
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defending NBA Champion Los Angeles Lakers. On three separate
occasions, the Los Angeles Lakers road schedule is strongly
coordinated with the NBA on national television (See Table One).
Table One - Los Angeles Lakers 2000-01 Television Coordinated
Road Schedule
Day

Date Opponent

National Network

Sun

1/28

New York Knicks

NBC

Tue

1/30

Cleveland

Wed

1/31

Minnesota

Tue

2/13

New Jersey

Wed

2/14

Philadelphia

Fri

2/16

Charlotte

Sun

2/18

Indiana

Wed

3/14

Detroit

Fri

3/16

Washington

Sun

3/18

Orlando

Mon

3/19

Atlanta

Wed

3/21

Milwaukee

TNT
TNT
NBC

NBC
TNT

(Source: NBA)
Through this scenario, the networks are receiving the most
desirable NBA product for their broadcasts: competitive teams
featuring the top players in the league.
Problems could arise between franchises as certain teams are
obviously on national television more than others. Teams such as
New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago might receive national
exposure often, but through the NBA broadcast agreements, each
team receives the same amount of national television revenue. Dave
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Checketts, former President and CEO of Madison Square Garden,88
explains the situation:
We don’t forget about the fact that we get a major share of
the national revenue. [However] . . . we get 1/29th of the
national revenue and our marketplace probably accounts
for 1/7th of the watching audience. . . . [I]f we were to
really argue that case, we would say we deserve much
more than 1/29th and so you shouldn’t put the Knicks on
national television any more than you do anyone else. . . .
[T]he truth is they put the Knicks on . . . as many times as
they possibly can, because we do have such interest in
New York.89
The rights fees from the league’s broadcast partners represent the
single largest source of shared revenue among the twenty-nine NBA
franchises. These franchises, in essence, have agreed not to compete
with one another in the area of broadcasting. In a free open market
and each team having permission to negotiate their own national
television contract, strong franchises from large media markets such
as the New York Knicks or Los Angeles Lakers would easily earn
more money than franchises in smaller markets such as the
Sacramento Kings or the Memphis Grizzlies. The greater revenue
could easily alter the scales of competitive balance between all of the
teams with large market teams being able to sign more high-priced
talent. The rationale for the revenue sharing of the NBA is
commented on in Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship and WGN Cont’l
Broad. Co. v. NBA:
It is not disputed, and it is plain from the financial figures,
that the prosperity of the league currently depends on the
volume of the shared revenues generated by the league’s
economic activity on behalf of the teams and particularly
88
Madison Square Garden houses three professional sports franchises: the New York
Knicks (NBA), the New York Liberty (WNBA), and the New York Rangers (NHL).
89
Interview with Dave Checketts, Former President & CEO, Madison Square Garden
(Oct. 16, 1998).
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on the revenues generated by the broadcast contracts with
the national networks.90
Ed Desser comments on the league revenue sharing ideas and the
importance of these objectives in the overall operation of the NBA,
stating how the revenue aspects of this play into issues of
competitive balance.
There are a whole variety of systems that are designed to
help maintain the integrity and quality of the product. It
goes beyond just how it is televised or how it is
presented. . . . Milwaukee and San Antonio collect the
same amount of network television revenue as the Knicks
and the Lakers [in order to give] them the same number of
chips, or close to the same number of chips, to play with
as they compete for talent.91
IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the federal
government permits the NBA, at the expense of individual teams, to
systematically maintain control over national television exposure of
its games. The philosophy of the federal government is clear:
professional sports leagues are unique and deserving of special
legislation like the SBA of 1961, which allows the league to pool the
broadcast rights to their games to the highest television network
bidder. Once this right to collectively package and sell the rights to
games has been granted, sports leagues now have their greatest
source of revenue.
In addition to unmatched revenue, television provides unmatched
exposure. The NBA policy of television exposure is if not dictated
by, at least permissible, through both legislative and judicial
government guidelines as expressed in the arguments that are a result
of Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship and WGN Cont’l Broad. Co. v.
90
91

NBA, 754 F. Supp. at 1340.
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NBA and its progeny. The NBA, and not individual teams, must
have the ability to control the overall television exposure of its
games in order to maintain the value of national television rights
contracts. The NBA’s extensive litigation in the WGN case,
particularly since it essentially focused on five games of the Chicago
Bulls, was illustrative of the league exerting its right to maintain
economic value and control exposure of national television. Once
league-wide control is permitted, the NBA and its broadcast partners
can then create a schedule of teams and games that is the most
appealing to the national television audience.

